UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/23109
3 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/SPANISH

LETTER DATED 3 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF ECUADOR AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a resolution adopted 2 October 1991 in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States condemning the recent coup d'état in Haiti and calling for the resumption of constitutional order in that country.

We should be very grateful if you could have the text of this resolution circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING
Ambassador

(Signed) Jose Ayala LASSO
Ambassador

ANNEX

AD HOC MEETING OF MINISTERS
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
2 October 1991
Washington, D.C.

OEA/Ser.F/V.1
MRE/RES. 1/91 Corr. 1
3 October 1991
Original: English

MRE/RES. 1/91

SUPPORT TO THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

THE AD HOC MEETING OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

HAVING SEEN:

The resolution of the Permanent Council of September 30, 1991, convoking an ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to resolution AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91), in response to the gravity of the events that have taken place in Haiti;

The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, approved at the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly, held at Santiago, Chile, in June 1991; and

Resolution AG/RES. 1117 (XXI-O/91) "Support for the Democratic Process in the Republic of Haiti";

HAVING HEARD:

The statement made to this meeting by the President of Haiti, Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide;

REAFFIRMING:

That the true significance of American solidarity and good neighbourliness can only mean the consolidation in this hemisphere, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man;

That one of the essential purposes of the Organization of American States is to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; and

That the solidarity of the American states and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those states on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy;

CONSIDERING:

That the grave events that have occurred in Haiti constitute an abrupt, violent, and irregular disruption of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratic government of that country;

That these events represent disregard for the legitimate Government of Haiti, which was constituted by the will of its people freely expressed in a free and democratic electoral process under international observation with the participation of this Organization; and

That those events have compelled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to leave Haitian territory temporarily and against his will,

RESOLVES:

1. To reiterate the vigorous condemnation voiced by the Permanent Council of the grave events taking place in Haiti, which deny the right of its people to self-determination, and to demand full restoration of the rule of law and of constitutional order and the immediate reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the exercise of his legitimate authority.

2. To request that the Secretary General of the Organization, together with a group of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member states, go to Haiti immediately to inform those who hold power illegally that the American states reject the disruption of constitutional order and to advise them of the decisions adopted by this meeting.

3. To recognize the representatives designated by the constitutional Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the only legitimate representatives of the Government of Haiti to the organs, agencies, and entities of the inter-American system.

4. To urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in response to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's request, to take immediately all measures within its competence to protect and defend human rights in Haiti and to report thereon to the Permanent Council of the Organization.

5. To recommend, with due respect for the policy of each member state on the recognition of states and governments, action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who hold power illegally in Haiti.

6. To recommend to all states that they suspend their economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and technical cooperation except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes.

7. To request the Secretary-General of the Organization to pursue efforts to increase the Inter-American Fund for Priority Assistance to Haiti, but to refrain from using it so long as the present situation prevails.

8. To recommend to the General Secretariat of the Organization the suspension of all assistance to those who hold power illegally in Haiti and to request the regional organs and institutions, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, and the Latin American Economic System (SELA), to adopt the same measure.

9. To urge all states to provide no military, police, or security assistance of any kind and to prevent the delivery of arms, munitions, or equipment to that country in any manner, public or private.

10. To keep open the ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to receive, with the urgency that this situation demands, the report of the Mission referred to in operative paragraph 2 of this resolution and to adopt, in accordance with the Charter of the OAS and international law, any additional measures that may be necessary and appropriate to ensure the immediate reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the exercise of his legitimate authority.

11. To transmit this resolution to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and to urge them to consider its spirit and aims.

UNITED
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S/23110
4 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 2 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 2 October 1991 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the conduct and demeanor of Mr. David Kay, Chief of the sixth nuclear inspection team, and in which the Minister requests that his letter should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 2 October 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to apprise you of the behaviour and of the systematically biased demeanour of the Chief of the sixth nuclear inspection team, Mr. David Kay, namely behaviour and demeanour which corroborate our previous statements to the effect that this person is serving the purposes of a United States policy hostile to Iraq, purposes which have no connection with the tasks defined by the United Nations. The recent published reports concerning his direct contacts, from Baghdad, with his superiors in the United States Administration, which are at variance with the apparent nature of his mission to act on behalf of the United Nations, have confirmed this fact.

The true state of affairs was also confirmed by the statements made on 30 September 1991 to a number of correspondents at United Nations Headquarters in New York by Mr. Rolf Ekéus, Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, when he said that Washington had received from David Kay important information relating to Iraqi documents before it was received by the United Nations.

Mr. Ekéus said that he and the members of the Special Commission were dissatisfied with this mode of action, the inspection teams being answerable only to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the Special Commission itself. He added that Washington was better informed of some intelligence information than was the United Nations. What is highly alarming is that Washington is leaking information received from David Kay to the press.

I

The Chief Inspector insisted on seizing information relating to the personal and family lives of employees of establishments belonging to the Ministry of Industry and Mining and to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. He also insisted on taking scientific and technical reports and the names of those who had collaborated in their preparation as well as administrative reports that had no relation to the appraisal of the nuclear programme.

The seizure of such information is a flagrant violation of a basic human right. What arouses our deepest concern is the fact that this measure was taken in the name of the United Nations and under its aegis, while no one can have any doubt that it is an act which serves the purposes of the United States intelligence community, for which the Chief Inspector works, with the objective of launching a campaign of intimidation against these employees and the members of their families and placing their lives in jeopardy. The Chief of the sixth inspection team went so far as to seek to have the nuclear physics textbooks studied at institutes and colleges regarded as being in violation of the relevant Security Council resolution. This is a serious matter that cannot be ignored or passed over in silence; he is thereby seeking to deprive Iraqi students of another basic human right, namely the right to learn.

Our concern is further aroused by the claim of the Chief Inspector and the members of the sixth inspection team on 23 and 24 September 1991 that documents were seized of which we know nothing. The team carried out an inspection of the buildings and confiscated documents before the employees concerned arrived, without their knowledge and without them seeing. This is unacceptable, and we have no explanation for the incident other than that the Chief Inspector and those of the team members who had private links with foreign intelligence circles were seeking particularly on 24 September 1991, to insinuate spurious documents that had nothing to do with us in order to provide a rationale for the false accusations given currency by the governments whose purposes they serve, namely purposes that have no connection whatever with the resolutions of the Security Council.

We reaffirm our position, as communicated by our Permanent Representative in his letter of 26 September 1991 to the President of the Security Council, that we do not and shall not acknowledge any documents other than those the numbers of which were given by the Chief of the Iraqi team in his letter of 23 September 1991 addressed to the Chief of the sixth international inspection team and those with respect to which an inventory was drawn up on 30 September 1991.

II

During the time the sixth nuclear inspection team under the leadership of Mr. David Kay was in Iraq, the Chief Inspector and some of the team members behaved in a provocative manner that was contrary to the most elementary norms that prevail in all countries. They performed actions that are incompatible with prevailing customs and values in Iraqi society, and we should like to cite some of them here:

1. On 23 and 24 September 1991, members of the team forced open doors, broke them down and broke locks. The team began its visit two hours before the start of the official workday and before the employees occupying the two buildings visited by the team had yet arrived.

2. On 23 September, some members of the team climbed over the fence before the team convoy arrived with its Iraqi escorts.

3. Some members of the team opened handbags and briefcases that were the private property of the staff and tampered with their contents, such as family photographs and medication.

4. Some members of the team thrust their hands into the pockets of the laboratory coats of female members of the laboratory staff. Such disgraceful behaviour is tantamount to scheming to steal personal items.

5. Some of them opened envelopes containing private letters, read the letters and tried to copy them.

6. They also copied letters sent by a research worker to an international periodical published in a European country requesting it to publish papers he had written.

7. They photographed the registration plates of private vehicles belonging to the staff.

8. On the pretext of washing himself one member of the team undressed in the middle of the parking lot in full sight of residents and families living in the apartments opposite. Such conduct constitutes a provocation to the sentiments of the local people and displays contempt for the values and morals of Iraqi society.

9. They endeavoured, by all possible means, to obtain personal information on all those employed in the Iraqi nuclear programme and in the industrial establishments that supplied it.

The Iraqi officials accompanying the team and the staffs at the sites the team visited exercised the greatest degree of self-control and behaved judiciously despite such provocative modes of behaviour.

In placing these facts before you, we are hopeful that you, the Security Council and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission will bring this provocative and offensive behaviour to a halt and that you will issue unequivocal instructions to inspection teams visiting Iraq that they must adhere to the tasks designated by the relevant Security Council resolutions and act in accordance with the proper legal interpretation of those resolutions. We further stress the matter that we raised at the time of the visit of Mr. Ekéus and Mr. Blix to Baghdad on 1 July 1991, namely that the selection of inspectors from countries that have particular, biased attitudes against Iraq is a major source of problems. We do not understand the reasons that prompted the Special Commission to include 27 Americans among the 44 members of the sixth inspection team, at a time when no one can be unaware that the United States is persisting in its pursuit of a hostile and biased policy against Iraq, a policy that has no connection with the resolutions of the Security Council.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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S/23111
4 October 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 3 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continue to violate Iraqi airspace as follows:

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1. On 30 September/1 October 1991, United States air activity inside Iraqi airspace reached a total of 45 sorties flown by 2 four-aircraft formations, 1 three-aircraft formation, 13 two-aircraft formations and 8 single aircraft at speeds of between 600 and 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of between 50 and 20,000 metres.

2. Air activity for the purposes of observation and provocation was concentrated over Arbil, Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah, Tall'afar, Rawanduz and Dukan.

3. At 1045 hours on the same day, two aircraft overflew Faruq airfield and performed aerobatic manoeuvres over a 15-minute period.

4. At 1105 hours on the same day, an F-111 aircraft overflew Firnas airfield at a speed of 500 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of between 300 and 400 metres.

II

1. On 1/2 October 1991, United States air activity reached a total of 37 sorties flown by 18 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at a speed of 720 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of between 2,000 and 8,000 metres.

2. Air activity for the purposes of observation and provocation was concentrated over Amadiyah, Arbil, Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall'afar and Dukan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/23112
4 October 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 30 September 1991 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the fifth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain of course available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. Leslie Thorne for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

REPORT ON THE FIFTH IAEA ON-SITE INPECTION IN IRAQ UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

14 - 20 September 1991

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

1991-09-25

REPORT ON THE FIFTH IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ
UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

14 - 20 September 1991

SALIENT POINTS

The inspection achieved the primary objective of ensuring that an inspection team was in Iraq during the period between major inspections to carry out follow-up work. This included:

- A check of all seals on nuclear material and hot cells. Two seals had been cut and one was missing. No explanation has been found, but no sinister purpose is obvious.
- An attempt to verify the inventory of nuclear material under seal. Confusion in the operators' labelling and bookwork requires more extensive work during future inspections.
- An inspection and NDA measurement of the fuel at the IRT 5000 reactor. 30% of the fuel was measured by random sampling, but 13 assemblies were inaccessible.
- Transport of the clandestinely produced plutonium.
- The taking and shipment of 115 samples.
- The shipment of a 93% enriched metal fuel plate.
- A preliminary investigation of the heavy water situation, which, however, produced no new information.
- An investigation into the extent of the chemical enrichment program, which is considered inconclusive.
- An examination of the mass spectrographs which have been been recovered.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The fifth inspection in Iraq under the terms of Security Council Resolution 687 took place from 14 to 20 September 1991. The team consisted of nine inspectors, with supporting staff consisting of two health physicists, a doctor and a medical auxiliary, a photographer and a communications specialist - i.e. fifteen people overall. Nine nationalities were represented among the inspectors and thirteen overall. Eight of the nine inspectors were from the staff of the IAEA. The ninth inspector was a chemical enrichment expert from an IAEA Member State.

2. The objectives of the inspection were limited to the carrying out of routine activities necessary as a follow-up to previous inspections. There was no intention to initiate new investigative activities, which were to be left to later, larger teams. In summary the objectives were to verify the seals which had earlier been placed on material and equipment and to verify (by the non-destructive analysis of random samples) that the material present was as declared. Additional tasks were to remove the bulk of the plutonium from the country; to take a rather large number of samples for destructive analysis, to complement previous samples; to establish the heavy water inventory; and to enquire further into the extent of Iraq's chemical enrichment program.

Hot Cells and Related Equipment

3. The hot cells and associated manipulators examined during the first inspection had been placed under seal during the third inspection to prevent any possibility of their further use. All such seals were checked. Out of twenty-four seals, twenty-one were found to be in good condition. Two seals were found to have been cut, but were still in place, and one seal was missing.

The Iraqi counterparts could offer no explanation other than to suggest that thieves had been attempting to recover scrap. This is highly implausible, but there seemed to be no plausible sinister explanation. Surrounding rubble from the bombing appeared to be undisturbed, and seals which had been applied to the two neighbouring cells were still intact. The sealing blocks at the back of the cells had been removed before the first inspection and were still lying damaged in the rubble.

4. Paper seals which had been applied to the doors of cells with reprocessing equipment in building 89 were intact. Metal seals which had been applied to the manipulators were removed for verification. The equipment in these cells is still intact, and paper sealing is not an adequate long-term protection. The removal or destruction of this equipment is necessary.

Inventory of Nuclear Material

5. As a result of the third and fourth inspections, several hundred tons of nuclear material had been collected into storage locations at Tuwaitha. In many cases, collection had been carried out in a hurry, without adequate paperwork. Some containers, which had been buried in the desert, were in poor condition. One of the objectives of this inspection was to go through this material and the associated records and establish a reliable inventory. The task proved even more difficult than expected and was not satisfactorily completed by the time of the team's departure. A larger team working full-time solely on this task for at least a week is required. The National Inspector for Iraq admitted that the figures he was using were from before burial took place and did not allow for any failure to recover the material totally. Random sampling therefore is not based on a known population and has no firm statistical basis. The first requirement is to establish with confidence what material is present. Until this is done, attempts to track the history of the material have no sound basis.

6. To understand the problem, one must realize that many hundreds of drums in several warehouses and dumps are involved. Also, some of the material is in a variety of inadequate containers - such as polythene bags - without proper labelling. Even when one has a sound container in an apparently well identified stratum, one cannot be sure what material is in it. For example, one sound drum apparently containing uranium trioxide was found - on being opened - to contain no less than six different types of material ranging from ore to metal turnings. Drums labelled "uranium oxide" appeared to be full of sand. It is possible that the declared contents are beneath the sand and that, as the Iraqis claim, the sand is the result of desert burial - but this has to be established. The National Inspector was made aware of the serious concerns of the team and of the impossibility of the team's accepting the Iraqi accounts in their present state.

Samples

7. Destructive analysis of material sampled in previous inspections had shown in some cases a highly significant difference in results between the laboratories in the USA and the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL). A sampling and analysis expert included in the team for this mission repeated some of the sampling in order to ensure that the sampling procedures were carried out correctly. His presence proved invaluable and it is strongly recommended that a similar expert be included in future teams. A total of 115 samples were taken.

8. In addition to routine sampling, the expert packaged and prepared for transport the plutonium which had been clandestinely produced from diverted uranium and later declared to inspectors. A small quantity of highly diluted material remains together with 33 sealed ampoules of plutonium-238 and six of plutonium-239. These are labelled and in the form in which they were originally shipped from the Amersham (UK) supplier. In all, 4.868 grams of plutonium have now been taken out of the country, leaving only 0.274 gram of plutonium.

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Fuel Measurements

9. Previous inspections had raised several important questions about the history of the fuel associated with the IRT 5000 reactor. These questions related both to the irradiated fuel still in the core, the reactor pool and the spent fuel store and to the unirradiated fuel in the store known as location A. A major objective of this inspection was to attempt to measure by non-destructive means the activity of this fuel and, from an analysis of the measurements, to determine the history of the irradiated fuel. Knowing its history would be important in determining whether clandestine irradiation had taken place and in estimating the extent of possible plutonium production. Non-destructive analysis of the fresh fuel would establish whether any removal of material may have taken place.

10. As a result of intensive work in very difficult conditions, it was possible to measure 15 assemblies of 93 % enrichment and two natural uranium assemblies (approximately 30% of the irradiated fuel) and to item-count the IRT 5000 and Tamuz reactor fresh fuel. Measurement of all the irradiated fuel was not possible, owing to high radiation levels caused by low water levels in the IRT 5000 reactor core and the storage locations. The low water level in the core prevented 13 of the fuel assemblies being lifted to more accessible measuring positions. Twenty-two of the remaining 63 assemblies in the pond and spent fuel store were measured on a random basis. The low water level in storage location B led to radiation levels of 50mSv/hr(5R/hr) at some of the working surfaces. A firm request was made to the Iraqi counterpart to increase the water level and to provide water treatment in a recommended form. On the positive side it must be recorded that the reactor core pond had been cleaned, so that visual examination of the fuel is much easier now than during previous inspections.

11. Detailed analysis of the measurements will take time. As a complement to the non-destructive measurements, one plate from the Tamuz fuel was packaged and removed to the IAEA laboratories at Seibersdorf, near Vienna.

12. During item-counting of the fresh fuel, two of the Soviet-type fuel assemblies were found to have had the top and bottom inert parts cut off. The Iraqi counterpart was asked for an explanation and gave the one which he claimed had been given to the first inspection team - i.e. that this had been done by mistake in the immediate aftermath of the first attack, when staff were trying to remove the fuel from the reactor site and could not get the fuel into the container. He volunteered that it was "a stupid thing to do", but cited the extremely excited condition of the personnel following the attack. IAEA records of the safeguards inspection in November show that the fuel was intact at that time, which is in line with the claim that the cutting was recent. However, the cuts seem to be rather more clean and precise than the cuts which a panic situation would produce. The evidence is inconclusive as between the Iraqi explanation and the hypothesis that the cutting was a preliminary to removal of the highly enriched component of the assembly.

Heavy Water

13. Questions were formally put relating to the quantity and location of heavy water. Three tons at least were known to have been supplied to Iraq in 1980. The counterpart replied that the required information had been given to the first inspection team, but there is no record of this. The counterpart stated that the heavy water had been stored at the Tamuz site and had not been used, owing to destruction of the Tamuz 1 reactor in 1981. During the bombing this year, the tank containing the heavy water split and the water escaped. The team were shown the tank in the bombed remains of the reactor; its condition was as described by the Iraqis. On the other hand, there is no way after such a long time of taking meaningful samples of the debris in order to establish whether the heavy water had been removed prior to the bombing. The question of quantity and location must remain open. The existence of any other heavy water was firmly denied.

Chemical Enrichment

14. Questions about the chemical enrichment program were put to the Iraqis at a formal meeting and were followed by visits to the site of the experimental facilities. The meeting produced no fresh information. The inspection of the site also failed to provide fresh information, the site having been cleared after being bombed. No trace remained of any equipment and, although smears were taken of the floors, evidence of the use of scrubbing machines suggests that these will not produce meaningful results.

15. The chemical enrichment expert who was a member of the team is of the opinion that a far from full disclosure has been made and that other facilities must exist. However, no evidence was presented to the other members of the team to support this belief.

Mass Spectrometers

16. The team had been assigned the task of checking the situation regarding mass spectrometers. One had been recovered from the rubble and the remains were inspected at Tuwaitha. This machine cannot be re-used. Four other machines were declared to be in existence, but were stated to have been so damaged when being recovered after the bombing that they were unusable. They were stored at the Geological Institute in Baghdad. A visit was paid to this site by the mass spectrometer expert on the team. Two of the machines (THQ machines) were from the Tarmiya site, where they were declared to have been used for product monitoring. Of the other two machines (MAT 26 machines), one had been used for work with gases (probably UF6), and one for work with solids. The wiring had been damaged, but they were otherwise in good condition and - in the opinion of the expert - could be rebuilt and used. The Iraqis expressed a wish to transfer the machines to institutes where they could be put to good use.

Removal of Fuel

17. Regarding the fuel which was to be removed from Iraq, the question was raised of insurance and legal responsibility for that fuel while it was being moved in Iraq. Mr Sami Al-Araji agreed that this was clearly Iraq's responsibility. Iraq would be responsible for safety and legal aspects until the fuel was loaded into the aircraft. He was keen for Iraq to be responsible for as much as possible in order to reduce costs for which Iraq would ultimately be charged. He even offered to transport any material to any other country.

Site Clearance

18. The Iraqis expressed an urgent desire to proceed with site clearance and renovation. They cited the psychological effect upon site staff as a reason. To anyone who has spent an appreciable time at this site, the reason is certainly plausible. The Iraqis were told that, while there would be no objection in principle to the removal of bombed structures, the Agency/Special Commission must be informed in advance so that the work could be authorized and adequately monitored.

Equipment

19. No attempt was made to inspect equipment recovered by the third and fourth inspection teams. This is to be done by a later team with suitable experts. The Iraqis expressed a strong wish to dispose of all recovered equipment as soon as possible, citing problems of security with the present dump sites. On the lines of the response given with regard to site clearance (see previous paragraph), the Iraqis were told that any proposals must be submitted in advance so that due consideration could be given to them.

Standards

20. Questions relating to analytical standards were asked. The Iraqis emphatically denied that they had any foreign analytical standards. They explained that they had tried to obtain some in 1985 or thereabouts but had met with an export embargo. As a result, they had had to generate their own secondary analytical standards.

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LETTER DATED 4 OCTOBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Singapore on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 713 (1991).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of the statement to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) CHEW Tai Soo

Annex

Statement issued on 1 October 1991 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 713 (1991)

In compliance with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 713 on Yugoslavia, the Singapore Government has implemented a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia with immediate effect. The embargo will remain in force until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of Yugoslavia.

The Singapore Government hopes that the implementation of UNSC resolution 713 will contribute to ending the violence and bloodshed in Yugoslavia.